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Learning from South Korea’s COVID-19 Response:
Why Centralizing the United States Public Health
System is Essential for Future Pandemic Responses
By: Meghan Ricci*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic revealed stark differences in governmental
preparedness across the globe.1 The United States, once thought of as a
global leader in public health, had the theoretical skill and efficiency to
handle the pandemic but failed to utilize those skills and resources during
an actual health crisis.2 In the spring of 2020, everyone watched the U.S.’s
reaction to the unfolding of the COVID-19 pandemic due to its historic
placeholder as a global leader and innovator. However, the performance
of the U.S. in response to the global pandemic disappointed both global
commentators and U.S. citizens.3
The Center for Disease Control (CDC) confirmed the first case of
COVID-19 in the U.S. on January 17, 2020, just days after the first reports
of positive cases outside of China occurred.4 Dr. Anthony Fauci, the U.S.’s
leading infectious disease expert and a member of the U.S. government’s
coronavirus response team, warned that the U.S. needed to make an
“abrupt change” in its pandemic response.5 He cautioned that the rate of
new daily cases could rise above 100,000 if nothing changed; the rate of
new daily cases predicted by Dr. Fauci came true on November 12, 2020.6
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1
Xuefei Ren, Pandemic and Lockdown: A Territorial Approach to COVID -19 in China, Italy, and
the United States, 61 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECON. 423 (Apr. 13, 2020).
2
See Drew Altman, Understanding the US failure on coronavirus – an essay by Drew Altman, THE
BMJ, Sept. 14, 2020, https://www.bmj.com/content/370/bmj.m3417 [https://perma.cc/X4FZ-3MQE].
3
Id. It needs to be noted that the COVID response in the US exposed dramatic and repulsive
longstanding racial inequalities. These inequalities need to be addressed but are beyond the scope of
this paper.
4
CDC Museum COVID-19 Timeline, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Aug. 4, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/museum/timeline/covid19.html#:~:text=January%2020%2C%202020%20CDC
,18%20in%20Washington%20state. [https://perma.cc/YTC9-KED3]; Derrick Bryson Taylor, A
Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/JD7Y-QCKE].
5
Josh Dawsey & Yasmeen Abutaleb, ‘A whole lot of hurt’: Facui warns of COVID-19 surge, offers
blunt assessment of Trump’s response, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fauci-covid-winter-forecast/2020/10/31/e3970eb0-1b8b11eb-bb35-2dcfdab0a345_story.html [https://perma.cc/NXD8-K7H8].
6
Dawsey, supra note 5; Julia Hollingsworth et al., November 12 coronavirus news, CNN (Nov. 13,
2020),
https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/coronavirus-pandemic-11-12-20intl/h_4f0e7093337d282647f59eec8f2de32b [https://perma.cc/2PHJ-LUVQ].
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By the end of November, the number of COVID-19 cases in the U.S. had
grown to over ten million positive diagnoses and 237,875 deaths.7
Meanwhile, the first case diagnosed in South Korea occurred on
January 20, 2020.8 South Korea had a total of only 27,427 positive cases
and 478 deaths as of November 2020.9 South Korea had an efficient,
controlled, and timely response to the global pandemic. The country’s
emergency public health structure, tracing technology, and extensive
security technologies allowed the South Korean government to control the
spread of COVID-19 exponentially better than the United States.
A.

Comparing South Korea and U.S. COVID-19 Experience

The two countries’ first positive tests were only days apart and both
experienced similar upticks in cases during the summer. This shared
timeline makes South Korea an ideal candidate to compare and contrast
the two countries’ responses and provides a potential guideline for the
development of pandemic legislation in the United States. However, for
this analysis to be worthwhile it requires the acknowledgement of the
differences in population size, structure of government, and cultural
differences between South Korea and the United States.
The United States is a democratic republic structured around the U.S.
Constitution that separates the government into three branches: executive,
legislative, and judicial.10 Additionally, it is important to note the federalist
structure of the U. S. government. This means that there is a central federal
government that works with smaller state governments.11 The federal
government acts in six key areas related to public health: policy making,
financing, protecting public health, collecting and disseminating
information about U.S. health and health care delivery systems, capacity
building for population health, and managing public health services.12
However, the responsibility for implementing public health measures
generally falls to the states.13 In contrast, in South Korea the structure of
government is a democratic unitary political system which only grants

7

Covid in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (NOV. 8, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/us/covid-cases.html [https://perma.cc/3ST4-MZHK].
8
Taylor, supra note 4.
9
Taylor, supra note 4; Coronavirus Resource Center, JOHN HOPKINS UNIV. OF MED.,
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html [https://perma.cc/6RYH-YB6M] (last visited Nov. 8, 2020).
10
Branches of the U.S. Government, USA gov, https://www.usa.gov/branches-of-government
[https://perma.cc/7VCC-G3P7] (last visited Feb. 2, 2021).
11
Federalism,
CORNELL
LAW
SCHOOL:
LEGAL
INFORMATION
INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/federalism [https://perma.cc/S76U-BARJ] (last visited Feb. 2,
2021).
12
INST. OF MED. (US) COMM. ON ASSURING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC IN THE 21ST CENTURY, THE
FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 103 (2002) (citing another source Jo Ivey
Boufford & Phillip R. Lee, Health Policies for the 21st Century: Challenges and Recommendations
for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund. 2001;
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK221231/ [https://perma.cc/4FW7-HU5V](last visited Feb.
5, 2021).
13
Id.
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local governments limited autonomy from the federal government.14 As
such, the federal government holds strict control over health crisis
management.15
While the size of population between the U.S. and South Korea is not
directly comparable, it is an important statistic when calculating the death
rate for COVID-19.16 South Korea had a significantly lower fatality rate
from the coronavirus than the United States.17 On November 26, 2020,
there were 10.06 COVID-19 related deaths per million people in South
Korea; however, in the United States there were 797.66 deaths per million
people.18
In addition to the population and governmental differences, the United
States historically has a culture of individualism, whereas South Korea’s
culture practices collectivism.19 South Korea’s practice of collectivism
expects people to develop and maintain loyalty to larger groups of people.
In contrast, the U.S. population is taught self-reliance above all else.20 The
loyalty and awareness of the larger community in South Korean culture
has a direct impact on the way that communities come together to handle
public health crises.21 The differences in culture, government, and
population drastically impacted the reactions that each country took in
response to the COVID-19 outbreak.22 Because significant differences
exist between the U.S. and South Korea, important lessons can be learned
from the actions taken by both countries during the COVID-19 crisis.
This paper will compare the COVID-19 response in South Korea to
the COVID-19 response in the United States. This paper will also address
potential legal issues with employing South Korean tactics in the U.S. due
to the following issues: (1) the highly valued individual rights found
throughout American culture; (2) the privacy protections provided by the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA); (3) the
subsequent electronic privacy protections provided by the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
(HITECH); and (4) the heavy politicization of the COVID-19 virus in U.S.
politics. Finally, this paper will offer suggestions for potential legislative
and technological strategies the U.S. could borrow from South Korea to
Jongeun You, Lessons from South Korea’s COVID-19 Policy Response, 506-7 AM. REV. PUB.
ADMIN. 801, 803-04 (2020).
15
Id.
16
Population Total, THE WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=KR-US&name_desc=true
[https://perma.cc/46ZM-VSGZ] (last visited Nov. 26, 2020); The population of South Korea totaled
51,709,098 people in 2019; the United States totaled 328,329,523 people.
17
Hannah Ritchie et al., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Deaths, Our World in Data,
https://ourworldindata.org/covid-deaths [https://perma.cc/ZC74-HHUZ].
18
Id.
19
3 IRWIN ALTMAN, ET AL., HANDBOOK OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY, 4 (John W. Berry et al.
eds., 2nd ed. 1996).
20
Id. at 4, 7.
21
Id.
22
Jay J. Van Bavel, et al., Using social and behavioral science to support COVID-19 pandemic
response, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 460, 463 (May 2020) https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562020-0884-z.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PBP-Q3N9].
14
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improve its response to future pandemics. These strategies include
implementing a centralized public health system, funding, and refunding
government agencies dedicated to preparing for future public health crises,
and implementing technological innovations that will assist in the tracking
and monitoring of infected individuals.
II.

THE DECENTRALIZATION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM DOOMED A
SUCCESSFUL PANDEMIC RESPONSE

Former President Donald Trump’s decisions to decentralize the
pandemic crisis response to individual states led to inconsistent regulation
by local and state governments.23 A lack of federal leadership resulted in
a failure to provide consistent and comprehensive testing, regulation, and
pertinent prevention information to the public.24 The floundering by the
U.S. federal government to provide a clear and comprehensive pandemic
response plunged the country into political and economic turmoil. 25
The U.S. federal government was slow to limit the freedoms of its
citizens and showed a late interest in technology that could have helped
contain and control the spread of COVID-19.26 Additionally, some
governmental responses contradicted the information and regulations
placed and recommended by the CDC.27 This reluctance to limit freedom
and adopt technology resulted in an exponentially higher infection and
death rate in the U.S. compared to South Korea.28
The confusing and contradictory messages that came from the U.S.
government forced state and local governments to find their own way
through the complexities of creating successful public health crisis plans.29
These plans often reflected partisan lines instead of public health
concerns.30 This confusion caused many citizens to ignore CDC guidelines
and prevented local and state governments from adequately regulating
their communities.31 The failure of the federal government to protect U.S.
citizens from preventable exposure draws the question: should the

23

Altman, supra note 2.
Ed Young, How the Pandemic Defeated America, ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/coronavirus-american-failure/614191/
[https://perma.cc/J9ND-FSX3]; Alex Fitzpatrick, Why the U.S. Is Losing the War on COVID-19, TIME
(Aug. 13, 2020), https://time.com/5879086/us-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/9LKZ-K9JN].
25
Patricia Cohen, Straggling in a Good Economy, and Now Struggling in a Crisis, N.Y. Times (Oct.
5, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/business/economy/coronavirus-economy.html
[https://perma.cc/8Y4A-ECQG].
26
Paul Biasco, All the things that George W. Bush said we should do to prepare for a pandemic that
Donald Trump ignored, INSIDER (May 31, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/george-bush-saidprepare-for-a-pandemic-that-trump-ignored-2020-5 [https://perma.cc/G9XC-74FK].
27
Fitzpatrick, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
28
John Hopkins Univ. of Med., supra note 9.
29
Fitzpatrick, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; Altman, supra note 2.
30
Fitzpatrick, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; Altman, supra note 2.
31
Jeff Tollefson, How Trump damaged science—and why it could take decades to recover, NATURE
(Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02800-9 [https://perma.cc/9XJFZESW].
24
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structures of the U. S. public health governance allow political party
loyalty to outweigh protecting the country’s public health?
III.

THE U.S. SHOULD RESTRUCTURE THEIR PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO
ALLOW FOR CENTRALIZED CRISIS PLANS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
NEW TECHNOLOGIES

While it would be easy, and largely accurate, to blame the former
Trump Administration for the rapid spread and devastating impact of the
COVID-19 disease, it is important that we try to understand the failures
that took place in order to prevent them from reoccurring.32 With the
evolution of technology and the current health risks, the U.S. needs to reevaluate its approach to emergency power and the patchwork structure of
the country’s federal and state public health systems. To create an effective
public health crisis plan, the federal government must establish a
centralized crisis structure that allows for one cohesive plan. This plan
would provide comprehensive and non-negotiable steps for local and state
governments to follow reducing confusion. The plan should include space
for mandatory testing, tracking, and treatment technologies so public
health officials can have a fast and efficient disease response. To
accomplish this feat, the U.S. government must prioritize pandemic
response planning (similar to the Bush and Obama Administrations) by
refunding key public health agencies. Additionally, this restructuring
cannot occur by executive order, which allows for repeal by a new
administration, instead the solution needs to arise in the legislature and
have sufficient safeguards to prevent abuse and disbandment.
IV.

COMPARING THE UNITED STATES’ COVID-19 RESPONSE TO SOUTH KOREA’S

A. United States’ COVID-19 Response
The U.S. response to the COVID-19 pandemic was disastrous in
comparison to global peers.33 The federal government responded slowly
to reports of the spreading global pandemic.34 This slow response,
partnered with the reluctance of the federal government to create a
cohesive national plan, revealed the consequences of honoring and
protecting a federalist approach to government.35 The outcome of the
jerry-rigged responses from local and state governments led to the rapid
spread of the disease and much higher numbers of infections than typically
expected of such a highly developed nation.36

32

Gavin Yamey & Gregg Gonsalves, Donald Trump: a political determinant of covid-19, 369 BMJ
(Apr. 2020), https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/369/bmj.m1643.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/8M4J7V6T].
33
Fitzpatrick, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
34
Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M Mello, Thinking Globally, Acting Locally – The U.S. Response
to COVID-19, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED e75(1), e75(2) (May 28, 2020).
35
Id.
36
Id.
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The Trump administration first implemented country-wide travel bans
on China as an initial response to the spread of COVID-19.37 Studies of
pandemic responses, however, show that travel bans are largely ineffective
and even detrimental to the prevention of communicable diseases like
COVID-19.38 Simply banning non-nationals does not allow for an
individualized risk assessment (ex. individual screening based on
symptoms instead of national origin) of potentially symptomatic
individuals.39
The early implementation of less effective prevention techniques
paired with heavy politicization of the COVID-19 pandemic and the
refusal of the federal government to provide a broad plan of attack led to
inconsistent guidelines, varied beliefs in informational media regarding
the pandemic, increased racial tensions, higher rates of infection
(compared with neighboring countries), and drastically different rates of
compliance to basic preventative guidelines.40
B. South Korea’s COVID-19 Response
In South Korea, the local governments lack autonomy from the
national government. This allowed governmental agencies to act quickly
to implement emergency controls at a national and local level. 41 The use
of surveillance and contact tracing allowed the government to protect and
warn their citizens of potential exposure, which increased the country’s
success in controlling the spread of the virus.42
Korea’s successful public health response came, in part, from the
lessons that the country learned during the Middle East Respiratory

37

Geoff Whitmore, When did President Trump Ban Travel from China? And Can You Travel to China
Now?, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/geoffwhitmore/2020/10/19/when-didpresident-trump-ban-travel-from-china-and-can-you-travel-to-china-now/?sh=d4764ef74847
[https://perma.cc/PH46-L593]; the administration put this ban into place on January 31 st of 2020.
38
Wendy E. Parmet, et al., COVID-19 – The Law and Limits of Quarantine, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED
e28(1), e28(2) (Apr. 9, 2020).
39
Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge Jr., US Emergency Legal Reponses to Novel Coronavirus:
Balancing Public Health and Civil Liberties, 323 JAMA 1131 (Feb. 13, 2020),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/2761556 [https://perma.cc/6V6Y-PKJL]. The
authors suggest that compulsory powers should be evaluated using five elements: “(1) individuals
must pose a significant risk of spreading a dangerous, infectious disease; (2) interventions must be
likely to ameliorate risks; (3) least-restrictive means necessary to achieve public health objectives are
required; (4) use of coercion should be proportionate to the risk; and (5) assessments must be based
on the best available scientific evidence. In emerging crises when the science is uncertain, adoption of
the “precautionary principle” is reasonable to ensure public safety.” They also noted that health
emergency responses do not allow for policy that is “indiscriminate, overbroad, excessive, or without
evidentiary support.”
40
Hank Rothgerber, et al., Politicizing the COVID-19 Pandemic: Ideological Differences in
Adherence to Social Distancing, PSYARXIV, (Sept. 27, 2020), https://psyarxiv.com/k23cv/
[https://perma.cc/PMU5-WGDB]; Lucy Wang Halpern, The Politicization of COVID-19, 120(11) AM.
J. NURSING 19-20 (Nov. 2020).
41
Jongeun You, supra note 14, at 802.
42
Id. at 803; South Korea: Legal Response to Health Emergencies, L IBR. CONG.,
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/health-emergencies/southkorea.php [https://perma.cc/6TWH-KYU8]
(July 24, 2020).
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Syndrome (MERS) outbreaks in 2015 and 2018.43 Organizations criticized
South Korea for its failure to control the spread of the MERS disease; in
response, the country upgraded its standard procedures for emerging
infectious diseases and clarified the roles and responsibilities of the
government regarding infectious diseases.44 South Korea’s pandemic
response largely revolved around prevention and preparedness.45 The
country focused on proactive testing, transparency in test results, and
working with private actors to ensure the development of efficient and
effective testing centers and testing kits.46
Intergovernmental cooperation and the public-private partnership
model developed by the Moon administration made South Korea’s mass
testing possible.47 The agreement between the national government and
Korean biotech corporations allowed for rapid development and
distribution of detection kits.48 These tests, paired with South Korea’s
numerous testing sites and extensive surveillance technology, allowed the
country to track and inform the public about the spread of the disease.49
The South Korean government repurposed the technology typically
used by law enforcement to trace and capture criminals for public health
use.50 The government gathers this information in three main ways: (1)
credit and debit card tracking, (2) phone location logs, and (3) surveillance
cameras.51 These different tracking methods allow the South Korean
government to track and warn those exposed to someone who has tested
positive.52 This ability resulted from the 2015 MERS outbreak.53
Following the 2015 public health crisis, the South Korean government
altered the Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act (IDCP) to allow
the government to access and share an individual’s private health data
during an infectious disease emergency.54 Once the emergency resolves,
this information is deleted.55 It is important to note that South Korea did
not use a typical contact tracing app to achieve this information sharing
but instead used an even more severe model that allowed the government
to enforce a mandatory download of a contact tracing app.56 This app

43

Jongeun You, supra note 14, at 802; See generally Kyoo-Man Ha, A lesson learned from the MERS
outbreak in South Korea in 2015, 92(3) J. HOSP. INFECTION 232 (2016).
44
See generally Kyoo-Man Ha supra note 43 explaining South Korea’s failures in and suggesting
changes that were later implemented.
45
Jongeun You, supra note 14, at 802.
46
Id. at 802-03.
47
Id. at 803.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Rory Cellan-Jones, Tech Tent: Can we learn about coronavirus-tracing from South Korea?, BBC
(May 15, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52681464 [https://perma.cc/GP5E-GZ93].
51
Id.
52
Jongeun You, supra note 14, at 803-04.
53
Id. at 803.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Salvator Babones, Countries Rolling out Contact Tracing Apps Show Why They Can’t Work,
FOREIGN POLICY, (May 12, 2020).
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allowed the government to monitor and share every citizen’s information
in a public database in order to control and track the spread of the virus.57
With the health information of individuals who tested positive, the
South Korean government could better control and warn their citizens
without imposing massive travel lockdowns.58 After the government
collected information from individuals that tested positive, it then issued
warnings to potentially exposed citizens. If an individual merely crossed
paths with a positive individual they followed the prescribed options of
conducting symptom monitoring, visiting a testing center, or selfquarantining.59 The government notified citizens in close proximity to an
individual who tested positive and they are subsequently tested and
possibly quarantined.60 A quarantined individual uses the app “SelfQuarantine Protection App” to connect the patient with health care
professionals.61 If a person violates a mandatory self-quarantine, the
government can enforce a heavy fine or potentially a year in prison.62
C. Criticism of The South Korea COVID-19 Response
At the beginning of South Korea’s response, the world expressed
concern with sharing individual health information even to prevent the
spread of a highly infectious disease.63 In March 2020, the BBC pointed
to a potential social stigma surrounding sharing personal health
information reporting that “South Koreans now fear the stigma as much as
they fear the virus itself.”64 To balance the privacy and civil liberties
concerns, the South Korean government worked to update the IDCP to
better protect those who tested positive by modifying patient disclosure
guidelines in order to exclude any individually-identifying personal
information.65
Even with the restrictions on data sharing, many still refer to this level
of response as draconic and extreme.66 Western countries in particular find
government-run mandatory contact tracing apps too big a threat to privacy
to consider it a viable option.67 Early in the pandemic, experts warned that
the world as a whole might need to implement more drastic techniques to
adequately control the spread of the disease.68 Since these early
assessments, researchers have found measures typically considered
57

Id.
Jongeun You, supra note 14, at 803-04.
59
Id. at 804.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Hyung Eun Kim, Coronavirus privacy: Are South Korean’s alerts too revealing, BBC (March 5,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51733145 [https://perma.cc/U4L3-4NJ3].
65
Jongeun You, supra note 14, at 804.
66
June Park, Striking a Balance between Data Privacy and Public Health Safety, THE NAT’L BUREA
ASIAN RSCH. (Apr. 29, 2021), https://www.nbr.org/publication/striking-a-balance-between-dataprivacy-and-public-health-safety-a-south-korean-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/X93W-24XJ].
67
Id.
68
Id.
58
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draconian by western cultures necessary to prevent the continued spread
of COVID-19.69
Ultimately, although privacy was a secondary concern of the South
Korean government, the efficiency of the government-run contact tracing
cannot be denied.70 While other less invasive possibilities exist, most of
the applications, even if voluntary, center around contact tracing and
monitoring people who have tested positive.71 These methods are less
effective than the “draconic” government run systems found in South
Korea.72
V.

AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY

Many technological innovations occurred in the last century.
Logically, countries had many systems available when they implemented
contact tracing applications during the early stages of the pandemic. These
technologies fall into two main architectural structures: centralized and
decentralized.73 Both models use Bluetooth signals in smartphones that
interact with each other when their owners’ cross paths.74 Once an
individual receives a positive diagnosis, the user will then update the
application to include their diagnosis.75 Centralized and decentralized apps
differ in the steps they take after users update the application with new
information.76
A. Basic Structures
Developers design a centralized model to gather protected health
information and upload it onto a remote server.77 Once an individual who
has tested positive updates their information on the app, centralized
databases upload the information, as well as additional codes received
69

Wung Lik Ng, To lock down? When to peak? Will there be an end? A macroeconomic analysis on
COVID-19 epidemic in the United States, (65) J. MACROECONOMICS, (Sept. 2020),
https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S0164070420301567?token=0CBF519149CB64C368D87E
754E60FAB3A25FD582937348F1DA6B9A4F466E8A18E5A6F077591CC8E695FABF3FE445341
C [https://perma.cc/ZXD4-CLV6?type=image]; ultimately to have any chance at fully halting the
spread of COVID-19 there needs to be a combination of approaches applied.
70
Rory Cellan-Jones, supra note 50; Choe Sang-Hun, et al., Major Security Flaws Found in South
Korea Quarantine App, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/technology/korea-coronavirus-app-security.html
[https://perma.cc/EU36-B8RJ].
71
Nadeem Ahmen et al., A Survey of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps, 8 IEEE ACCESS 134577
(2020).
72
See Ahmen, supra note 71; Parmet, supra note 38 (although travel bans do not qualify as a
technology, but governments often see them as a first step to pandemic containment).
73
Christina Criddle & Leo Kelion, Coronavirus contact tracing: World Split between two types of
apps, BBC NEWS, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52355028 [https://perma.cc/2926-D2FC]
(last visited Feb. 5th, 2021); Choe Sang-Hun, et al., Major Security Flaws Found in South Korea
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from other phones, in the form of an anonymous ID.78 Once uploaded to
the centralized database, the server uses the database to perform contact
matching and notify those who have potentially been exposed.79
A decentralized model follows a similar process up until the uploading
of the anonymous ID.80 In a decentralized model, once the individual
updates the application the centralized database only uploads an
anonymous ID without any additional code.81 Once processed, the
individual’s phone downloads the database and performs contact tracking
and risk analysis.82
B. The Obstacles to Implementation of Centralized and Decentralized
Systems May Hinder Their Effectiveness
Although these processes seem incredibly similar, how to implement
them is proving to be very divisive in the global community.83 Singapore,
Norway, and France all implemented a centralized process but have
encountered resistance from technology developers like Google and
Apple.84 This tension arises from the app’s inability to function properly
with Apple and Google’s restrictions on Bluetooth for their phones.85
Additionally, the centralized app’s user base had large percentages of its
users drop out due to privacy concerns.86 In Norway, only 20.5% of its 1.5
million users actively use the app.87
Comparatively, the decentralized style apps have garnered larger
global support. However, due to its delay in implementation, countries
have gathered less information on this style of app, so it is impossible to
know if this style will work any better than its counterpart. 88 In the U.S.,
the cooperation of state governments and their efficiency of releasing their
state-specific apps to work in tandem with Apple or Google’s technologies
will determine the effectiveness of the apps.89
VI.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE BARRIERS IN THE U.S. THAT
HINDER EFFECTIVE PANDEMIC RESPONSES

A tension exists in the United States between the protection of
individual personal liberties and the protection of the overall public health.
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The Fourteenth Amendment protects U.S. citizens’ life, liberty, and
property. It states that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.90
The right to liberty in the U.S. is a fundamental component of the
American dream.91 The right to life, liberty, and happiness has been a
historically protected right and something that many Americans hold
above all else.
Additionally, the Fourth Amendment protects the right to security in
both person and belongings from search and seizure. Many Americans fear
that they will lose these rights with the increased government regulation
during the COVID-19 pandemic.92 The adversarial political climate in the
U.S. at the beginning of the pandemic further exacerbated this fear.93 Many
Americans, regardless of their party affiliation, told the New York Times
that they feared the demise of American democracy.94 The COVID-19
pandemic and accompanying antagonistic governmental climate has
thrown the country’s drastically differing opinions on the importance of
public health and individual rights into the spotlight.
A. Protected Health Information
The U.S. government protects health information by both legal and
personal necessity. In response to the need to keep health information
protected, the U.S. government has created both the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH).95 Both acts
uniquely impacted the U.S. government and health care systems’ COVID19 response.96
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B. HIPAA and HITECH: Overview and COVID-19 Related Challenges
The U.S. Congress enacted HIPAA in 1996 and it required the
development of national standard for sharing protected health information
(PHI).97 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
enforces HIPAA and requires compliance from healthcare related
businesses and practitioners.98 The HITECH act works in conjunction with
HIPAA as a rule enacted in the economic stimulus package issued by the
Obama administration in 2009.99 HITECH regulates the use and protection
of PHI in the form of electronically transmitted health data.100
A notable portion of HIPAA is the privacy rule, which addresses
the use of PHI by “covered entities.”101 Covered entities can be individuals
or corporations.102 The CDC states main goal of the privacy rule as:
ensur[ing] that individuals’ health information is properly protected while
allowing the flow of health information needed to provide and promote
high quality health care and to protect the public’s health and well-being.
The Privacy Rule strikes a balance that permits important uses of
information while protecting the privacy of people who seek care and
healing.103 COVID-19 has challenged this, and many believe HIPAA did
not successfully achieve its purpose.104
HIPAA regulations have exceptions for a public health crises, but
the exceptions are limited.105 If both the President and the Secretary of
Health declared a public emergency, then the Secretary may waive
sanctions and penalties against hospitals who do not comply with certain
sections of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.106
The current patchwork of state laws and HIPAA imposed regulations
have complicated the path that healthcare providers, corporations, and
legislatures can take to circulate valuable COVID-19 data.107 The current
law focuses on the anonymization of PHI, not the patient’s continued
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care.108 To successfully respond to the threat of COVID-19, experts
recommend the government take immediate legislative action that shifts
the focus away from privacy and towards an equal balance that allows for
the safe, secure, and standardized health care exchange between multiple
parties.109
C. Historic Acknowledgment of Privacy Rights Regarding Protected Health
Information
Historically, the federal government possessed the power to share
personal health information to aid in protecting the greater community.110
In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court acknowledged the flexible approach
taken when dealing with privacy and healthcare.111 The Court determined
the constitutionality of New York legislation that required the existence of
a computer record of all individuals given a prescription for a Schedule II
narcotic.112 The Court noted that:
some individuals' concern for their own privacy may lead
them to avoid or to postpone needed medical attention.
Nevertheless, disclosures of private medical information
to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance companies,
and to public health agencies are often an essential part of
modern medical practice even when the disclosure may
reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient.
Requiring such disclosures to representatives of the State
having responsibility for the health of the community,
does not automatically amount to an impermissible
invasion of privacy.113
In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens acknowledged three things
that allowed for future litigation in regards to an individual’s privacy: (1)
an individual interest in privacy of health information; (2) this kind of
information is entitled to protections because it is “personal in character
and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed and; (3) the right to
collect this type of information should typically be accompanied by “a
concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted
disclosures,” even if collected for public purposes.114 This conclusion
allowed future litigators and courts to apply a balancing test that measured
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the need of the government to obtain records in the interest of public health
and the individual’s interest to keep that information private.115
In Doe v. City of New York, the court applied this balancing test
and concluded that “individuals who are infected with the HIV virus
clearly possess a constitutional right to privacy regarding their
condition.”116 The court further explained that:
Extension of the right to confidentiality to personal
medical information recognizes there are few matters that
are quite so personal as the status of one's health, and few
matters the dissemination of which one would prefer to
maintain greater control over. Clearly, an individual's
choice to inform others that she has contracted what is at
this point invariably and sadly a fatal, incurable disease is
one that she should normally be allowed to make for
herself.117
This privacy right is not absolute, however. The court in US v.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation found that courts and legislatures
could find that public health concerns (or other public concerns in general)
outweigh the interests of an individual and allow for access to otherwise
protected information.118
VII.

GOVERNMENTAL QUARANTINE POWERS AND CURRENT STATE ACTION
PLANS

A. The Tools that Might have been Available if not for Defunding
In times of public health crisis, the tools available to the federal
government began to notably expand under President Clinton in 1998
through a presidential directive intended to build a stockpile of vaccines
in anticipation of bioterrorism.119 President Bush continued the work to
better prepare the United States following the 9/11 attacks due to the rising
fear of chemical warfare.120 President Bush acknowledged the real threat
of potential viral pandemics, stating in 2005 that “a pandemic is like a
forest fire, if caught early, it might be extinguished with limited damage;
if allowed to smolder undetected, it can grow to an inferno that spreads
quickly beyond our ability to control it."121
From 2002 to 2005, the Bush administration increased the budget of
the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS) and spent roughly $1.24
115
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billion, focusing on expanding the stockpile of pharmaceuticals, medical
devices, and personal protective equipment that could be made available
to U.S. citizens in the time of a pandemic.122 Additionally, President Bush
announced the adoption of a three-pronged national public health strategy:
(1) early pandemic detection, (2) increased stockpile of critical supplies,
and (3) an emphasis on preparedness.123 Following the Bush
administration, President Obama established the Biodefense unit tasked
with the continuation of pandemic preparedness.124 Unfortunately, under
the leadership of President Trump, most, if not all, of these programs and
structures were defunded or altered to the point of ineffectiveness.125
B. The Reality of the Federal Response to Public Health Crisis
The U.S. government and the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) technically have the power to mandate strict
lockdowns.126 However, to impose a broad and strict lockdown, the
government must satisfy several constitutional requirements.127 Courts
have held that those constitutional requirements include: (1) quarantines
cannot be imposed in a racially discriminatory manner; (2) the government
must prove a strong basis for restrictions; (3) any person who is detained,
or who has their liberty restricted, has a right to judicial review; and (4)
the government must meet the basic needs of any such person detained or
restricted.128
In addition to the powers given to the CDC, the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), allows the
president to declare a state of emergency and reallocate emergency funds
from Congress to states in need.129 Through a Stafford Act declaration, the
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Secretary of Health, may, in times of emergency, waive certain federal
regulations like HIPAA and HITECH.130 The Stafford Act allows the
federal powers to broaden during a time of emergency and could remove
roadblocks that prevent research and patient care.131 However, this act
does not remedy the issue of conflicting state and federal law. Instead, the
act only allows the allocation of emergency funds to states.132 The Stafford
Act, while useful in granting state and local government funds to fight
pandemic emergencies, does not resolve the conflicting information
coming from the state and local governments regarding preventative
health and safety measures. Until a cohesive and comprehensive standard
of citizen directives exist, a tool like the Stafford Act may not be as
effective as it appears.
C. The Dangers of Politics in Times of Crisis
In addition to the strict requirements placed on the implementation of
federal restrictions, political infighting and mixed messages from all levels
of government hampered the U.S.’s response.133 The most successful state
responses reflect both major political parties’ willingness to work
together.134 For example, in Vermont, the moderate Republican Governor
and Democratic legislature worked together to create a joint effort to
control the disease. 135 The failure of other states’ legislatures to follow suit
hampered those states’ responses.136
Creating a functional public health response for future public health
crises will require understanding how to work with the strong sense of
federalism in America.137 Until the political parties cooperate, the
continued confusion born from inconsistent information and regulation
will proceed, and many more Americans will die as a result. When the next
public health crisis arises, the U.S. government must have a public health
plan in place that will allow the government to issue rapid, efficient, and
understandable rules and regulations that will protect U.S. citizens from
infection and death rates like those in the COVID-19 pandemic. This
solution, ultimately, will need to go beyond having a cohesive federal and
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state government public health plan but will require more permanent
systems shielded from political bias.
VIII.

ADOPTING TOOLS USED IN SOUTH KOREA TO BETTER RESPOND TO FUTURE
HEALTH CRISES IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Legislative Change is Essential to Effective Pandemic Responses
A policy and structure to guide law makers in future health crises
can help alleviate the political pressures that sway the decisions of many
state leaders. Legislatures could potentially improve the use of technology
in health crises and eliminate barriers that make efficient responses
impossible. Similar to South Korea, creating legislation that centralizes the
public health responses to crises and clarifies the federal government’s
role in public health situations, can allow for the more efficient use of mass
public data to contain and regulate infectious diseases. Having a clear
guideline to the expectations of governmental agencies in times of crisis
establishes trust in governmental orders and allows for a more cohesive
plan of attack. Having a standard and a centralized approach to public
health crises would also improve the complexities of state and federal
public health regulations. It would make it easier for patients, providers,
and medical technology corporations to work together with the
government to better control future public health emergencies.
Additionally, the establishment of relationships between private biotech
companies and the government would help to ensure a greater ease in the
production of testing material as well as any other medical technology
needed to prevent and track any future diseases.
The use of COVID-19 as a political bargaining chip has
convoluted the clarity of public health recommendations from the CDC
and local governments. Identifying the failures experienced in the
COVID-19 pandemic and learning from other countries’ responses can
shape how the U.S. responds to future public health crises. The U.S. should
draft legislation similar to South Korea’s IDCP that reallocates the funding
of public health responses to particular government agencies and leaves
no room for political game play. Legislation that reallocates funding to the
CDC to allow for more effective power and legitimate control in an
emergency response would remove the fear of political influence and
allow a more effective and rapid governmental response.
Additionally, any legislation that has the power to remove an
individual's liberty needs to have an adequate and established system of
checks and balances to ensure no abuse of the legislation.138 The system
could use extensive judicial review and politically neutral decision makers
to ensure protection of the public health from those seeking to corrupt and
abuse the system. Reallocating and clarifying the roles of governmental
bodies in times of crisis increases trust in governmental response and
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allows for more efficient outcomes.139 The clear lines of responsibility
would also make the formation of effective checks and balances easier to
accomplish.140
B. Tipping the Scale
The importance that Americans place on their right to choose and
their right to privacy is an intimidating hurdle in effective pandemic
responses. However, if new legislation reduced or eliminated the
politicization of emergency responses to public health crises, this might
spark a needed shift in public opinion.
The U.S.’s current political climate makes a cohesive and
effective response almost impossible. The desire to have choice must not
outweigh the necessity to protect the greater population from preventable
illness. To move forward, the U.S. must remove the political pressure of
partisan governance from public health measures.
However, Bill writers must develop any legislation with a clear
awareness of the complexities of the U.S. legislative branch. On
November 27th, 2020, the Republican party held the U.S. Senate. The
Republican party presented the popular federalism arguments against
potential COVID-19 regulations. These arguments emphasize the right of
states to form and lead their own public health responses. However, this
pandemic revealed the failures of a federalist-styled public health
response. The U.S. government must weigh the protection of the country’s
public health above any individual’s right to liberty, privacy, and choice.
South Korea’s response demonstrated how shifting the lens of public
health response from individual protection to the collective health of the
community can drastically improve the containment of highly
communicable diseases.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The United States was poised to have one of the most effective
pandemic responses in the world because of the work put in by former
presidential administrations to emphasize the importance of pandemic
preparedness. However, due to the politicization of COVID-19 and
consequent illogical and inconsistent governmental information, the
country’s handling of the pandemic was disappointing at best. The public
health crisis created by the rapid spread of COVID-19 threw the failures
of the U.S. government into sharp relief. A growing mistrust in
government-issued information and regulation has led to varying levels of
compliance with CDC guidelines. Further, as the government relied on
ineffective measures like travel bans, the government failed to issue an
effective pandemic response, cementing the need for an upheaval of the
current public health emergency response plan. South Korea, alternatively,
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has been hailed as one of the creative leaders in pandemic responses. The
country’s use of surveillance clearly established governmental roles, and
data sharing allowed the country to handle the virus with remarkably
effective results. Although western countries saw some of the country’s
methods as overly oppressive, the U.S. could use guidelines within the
overall plan to design an effective and improved pandemic response in the
future.
To ensure adequate preparation by the U.S. for future public health
crises, they should borrow lessons from the South Korean COVID-19
response. The most effective elements that the U.S. government should
implement are to: (1) reallocate funds and governmental power for future
health emergencies; (2) establish bipartisan cooperation in times of global
health crisis or create a separation of public health and political
gamesmanship; and (3) create emergency legislation to outline attack plan
for future pandemics. While the United States’ response to COVID-19 can
fairly be described as a failure, correcting the damages to our public health
systems, learning from our global peers, and adapting effective foreign
pandemic prevention techniques for the U.S., will allow the country to be
better prepared for any future public health crisis.

